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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Sharon Kay Eldred appeals from the district court's Judgment and Commitment 
Order sentencing her to ten years, with three years fixed. Ms. Eldred asserts that her 
right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the United States and Idaho Constitutions, was 
violated because of the prosecutor's misconduct in this case. Specifically, Ms. Eldred 
asserts the prosecutor struck multiple "foul blows" culminating in the prosecutor 
misrepresenting the presumption of innocence, expressing her own belief in 
Ms. Eldred's guilt, misrepresenting the evidence, and appealing to the passions and 
prejudices of the jury. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
David Jones was driving onto the interstate when he noticed the white Ford 
Tempo in front of him driving erratically. (Trial Tr., p.45, L.4 - p.47, L.12.) He began to 
follow the car westbound toward Nampa, Idaho and eventually called dispatch when he 
became concerned about the car's erratic driving. (Trial Tr., p.47, L.12 - p.48, L.10.) 
He followed the white Tempo for two hours, including several stops. (Trial Tr., p.48, 
L.11 - p.68, L.14.) At one point, the white Tempo stopped at WALMART, Mr. Jones 
approached the car, and attempted to speak with the driver, whom he identified as 
Ms. Eldred, before she drove off again. (Trial Tr., p.54, L.3 - p.61, L.16.) Eventually 
the car stopped at a residence in Middleton, Idaho, Ms. Eldred got out of the car, and 
she went into the home. (Trial Tr., p.66, L.2 - p.68, L.10.) As Ms. Eldred was entering 
the home, Officer Chamberlain finally arrived and Mr. Jones directed him to Ms. Eldred, 
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explaining she was the driver of the white Tempo Mr. Jones had reported. (Trial 
Tr., p.66, l.2 - p.68, l.10, p.86, L.15, p.92, L.5 - p.96, L.23.) 
Officer Chamberlain parked his patrol vehicle and followed Ms. Eldred into the 
home. (Trial Tr., p.97, L 18 - p.102, L.9.) After attempting to conduct field sobriety 
tests, Officer Chamberlain arrested Ms. Eldred and took her to the Canyon County Jail. 
(Trial Tr., p.109, L.6 - p.111, L 10.) Ms. Eldred agreed to submit to an lntoxilyzer 5000 
breath test. (Trial Tr., p.114, Ls.15-17, p.119, Ls.2-6.} Her breath tests results were 
both .264; however, the test indicated the samples were deficient. (Trial Tr., p.119, L.13 
- p.120, L.8.} 
Ms. Eldred was subsequently charged by Information with felony operating a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. (R., pp.25-28.) Ms. Eldred filed a 
motion to suppress arguing that the officer's entry into the home to seize Ms. Eldred 
was unconstitutional and the evidence obtained should be suppressed as a fruit of this 
illegal search and seizure. (R., pp.36-38.) The motion was ultimately denied by the 
district court, in part because she never established she had standing in the residence 
Officer Chamberlain entered without consent. (R., pp.54, 110-22.) 1 
The case proceeded to trial and the jury ultimately found Ms. Eldred guilty of 
driving under the influence of alcohol and Ms. Eldred pied guilty to the felony 
enhancement. (R., p.108; Trial Tr., p.250, Ls.2-20.) The district court sentenced 
Ms. Eldred to ten years, with three years fixed. (R., pp.130-31.) Ms. Eldred filed a 
1 Because Ms. Eldred's standing to challenge the illegal entry into the residence was 
never established below, the denial of her motion to suppress is not being pursued on 
appeal. 
2 
timely Notice of Appeal from the district court's Judgment and Commitment. 
(R., pp.132-35.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the State violate Ms. Eldred's right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 13 of the 
Idaho Constitution, by committing multiple acts of prosecutorial misconduct during the 
closing arguments? 
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ARGUMENT 
The State Violated Ms. Eldred's Right To A Fair Trial. Guaranteed By The Fifth And 
Fourteenth Amendments To The United States Constitution And Article I.§ 13 Of The 
Idaho Constitution, By Committing Multiple Acts Of Prosecutorial Misconduct During 
The Closing Arguments 
A. Introduction 
Ms. Eldred asserts that the prosecutor violated her right to a fair trial, guaranteed 
by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and 
Article I,§ 13 of the Idaho Constitution, when she misrepresented the presumption of 
innocence, expressed her own belief in Ms. Eldred's guilt, misrepresented the evidence, 
and appealed to the passions and prejudices of the jury. These prosecutorial "foul 
blows" committed during trial and closing arguments amounted to fundamental error 
and this Court should vacate Ms. Eld red's conviction in light of this misconduct. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Prosecutorial misconduct will only be reviewed for fundamental error absent an 
objection below. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 185 P.3d 273, 285 (2007). The 
Idaho Courts have noted that when reviewing fundamental error each case will "stand 
on its own merits" and "[o]ut of the facts in each case will arise the law." State v. 
Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 470, 163 P.3d 1175, 1182 (2007) (quoting State v. 
Bingham, 116 Idaho 415,423, 778 P.2d 424 432 (1989)). 
C. Fundamental Error Occurred In This Case When The State Violated Ms. Edlred's 
Right To A Fair Trial By Committing Multiple Acts Of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
During The Closing Arguments 
Although there was no objection to the prosecutor's comments at trial and during 
closing arguments in this case, prosecutorial misconduct can be reviewed for 
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fundamental error when there has not been an objection made below. See State v. 
Field. 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007); State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710, 
715, 85 P.3d 1109, 1114 (Ct. App. 2003). A fundamental error is one that "'so 
profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused 
of his constitutional right to due process."' State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 470, 
163 P.2d 1175, 1182 (2007) (quoting State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 281, 77 P.3d 
956,970 (2003); State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178,180,824 P.2d 109, 111 (1991)). It has 
been defined as an error which "goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights 
or ... to the foundation of the case or take[s] from the defendant a right which was 
essential to his defense and which no court could or ought to permit him to waive." Id. 
(quoting State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 423, 776 P.2d 424, 432 (1989)). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that "[p]rosecutorial misconduct rises to the 
level of fundamental error when it is calculated to inflame the minds of the jurors and 
arouse prejudice or passion against the defendant, or is so inflammatory that the jurors 
may be influenced to determine guilt on factors outside the evidence." Kuhn, 139 Idaho 
at 715, 85 P.3d at 1114. The prosecutor's actions or comments must be so egregious 
or inflammatory that a curative jury instruction could not have remedied the misconduct. 
Id. This reflects the rationale behind the rule, that even if the defendant had made a 
timely objection to the inflammatory statements, the objection would not have cured the 
inherent prejudice. Id. This also reflects the fact that the trial court itself possesses the 
power to sua sponte intervene when prosecutorial misconduct is sufficiently egregious 
and prejudicial. State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 88 n.2, 156 P.3d 583, 589 n.2 (Ct. App. 
2007) (noting that "[t]he trial courts of this state possess authority and are encouraged 
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to monitor the course of closing arguments, to sua sponte intervene as warranted, and 
to impose remedies or sanctions as appropriate to protect an accused's right to a fair 
trial"). Therefore, when reviewing a question of prosecutorial misconduct, the appellate 
Court must first determine whether the complained about conduct was improper, then, if 
so, whether the misconduct impinged on the defendant's right to a fair trial, or whether 
the misconduct was harmless. Kuhn, 139 Idaho at 715, 85 P.3d at 1114. 
In this case, the prosecutor struck multiple "foul blows" during the closing 
arguments, including misrepresenting the presumption of innocence, expressing her 
own belief in Ms. Eldred's guilt, misrepresenting the evidence, and appealing to the 
passions and prejudices of the jury. 
1. The Prosecutor Improperly Misstated The Presumption Of Innocence. And 
Commented On The Ultimate Fact For The Jury When She Referred To 
The Defendant's Cloak Of Innocence And Her Burden Of Proof 
It is prosecutorial misconduct for a prosecutor to misstate the law or the 
reasonable doubt standard in closing arguments. Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86, 156 P.3d at 
587); State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 769, 864 P.2d 596, 607 {1993). See also 
State v. Miles, 139 Wash.App. 879, 162 P.3d 1169 (Wash.App.Div.2. 2007) ("Although 
prosecutors have "wide latitude" to make inferences about witness credibility, it is 
flagrant misconduct to shift the burden of proof to the defendant.") It is the State's 
burden to prove each element of its case beyond a reasonable doubt and the defendant 
has no duty to present any evidence. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
Likewise it is misconduct for the prosecutor to include her personal opinions and beliefs 
about the guilt or innocence of the accused. Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86, 156 P.3d at 587. 
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Although the Idaho Appellate Courts have never specifically addressed this 
specific misconduct, several jurisdictions have found it to be misconduct when the 
prosecutor has referred to the cloak of innocence as having been lifted, shredded, 
stripped away, or otherwise removed by the State or its evidence. In Pagano v. Allard, 
218 F.Supp.2d 26 (D. Mass. 2002) the federal district court of Massachusetts found that 
the prosecutor's closing argument that the defendant's protection from the cloak of 
innocence had now come off violated the petitioner's constitutional right to be presumed 
innocent because it incorrectly suggested that the presumption of innocence would not 
apply during jury deliberations. Id. Likewise, the Illinois appellate courts have found 
that it is improper to state that the presumption of innocence has been lifted because it 
is not lifted until the defendant is found guilty by the jury. People v. Brooks, 345 
III.App.3d 945, 949-50, 803 N.E.2d 626, 629-30 (Ill. App. 2004); People v. Toney, 337 
11I.App.3d 122, 148-50, 785 N.S.2d 138, 159-161 (Ill. App. 2003) (stating that the 
defendant "enjoys the presumption of innocence until the jury decides during 
deliberations that the defendant is guilty of the charged offenses, and therefore, the 
prosecutor's comment that the defendant was no longer cloaked in innocence because 
"[w]e have torn that from him" or similar comments should not be repeated during the 
retrial already ordered). Finally, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has 
repeatedly addressed this issue and found it was misconduct to refer to the cloak of 
innocence as being lifted during closing arguments. Hamilton v. State, 937 P.2d 1001 
(Ok. Crim. App. 1997) (ruling that although the references to the cloak of innocence 
being stripped away were misconduct, the misconduct was harmless) abrogated on 
other grounds by Alverson v. State, 983 P.2d 498 (Ok. Crim. App. 1999); Miller v. State, 
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843 P.2d 389 (Ok. Crim. App. 1992) (finding that prosecutor's comments that the 
defendant's cloak of innocence was gone "ripped away from him by the testimony of 
three men-four men, actually" and that, therefore, the defendant was "guilty as charged" 
amounted to prosecutorial misconduct rendering the trial "fundamentally unfair"). 
Here, the prosecutor in this case began her closing argument by stating: 
I talked a little bit during voir dire about a cloak of innocence being 
placed on Ms. Eldred's shoulders when she walked in that door, and it 
was a heavy cloak, because it is a heavy burden to remove it. And it is a 
burden that I, and I alone must suffer. And it is a burden that I must 
present my testimony and I must show you my exhibits. And only through 
that, can that cloak be lifted. 
Ladies and gentlemen, the cloak has been lifted. Ms. Eldred is 
guilty of driving under the influence .... 
(Trial Tr., p.218, Ls.12-22.) like the cases from other jurisdictions cited above, this 
statement by the prosecutor infers that Ms. Eldred's presumption of innocence has 
already been lifted before the case is submitted to the jury. 
Additionally, by stating unequivocally, "Ms. Eldred is guilty of driving under the 
influence" the prosecutor is improperly expressing her own belief in Ms. Eldred's guilt. 
Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86, 156 P.3d at 587. Furthermore, this case is even more 
egregious than those cited above because the State also referred to the burden of proof 
as a burden she must "suffer." This comment also misrepresents the burden of proof 
and plays on the jury's emotions by implying that this burden is something bad or 
burdensome for the prosecution to carry. See id. Therefore, the prosecutor's argument 
related to her burden of proof and Ms. Eldred's cloak of innocence was prosecutorial 
misconduct amounting to fundamental error. 
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2. The Prosecutor Improperly Misrepresented The Evidence In Closing 
Arguments 
The Fourteenth Amendment due process clause's prohibition on knowingly using 
false evidence to obtain a conviction, applies not only to entirely fabricated evidence, 
but to arguments that misstate the evidence adduced at trial. See Miller v. Pate, 386 
U.S. 1, 7 (1967); United States v. Feams, 501 F.2d 486, 488-89 (7th Cir. 1974). 
Therefore, a prosecutor cannot misrepresent or mischaracterize the evidence during his 
closing arguments. Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86, 156 P.3d at 587. Here, the prosecutor 
mischaracterized the evidence presented in her closing argument by stating that Ms. 
Eldred "refused" to properly blow into the intoxilyzer machine. 
In her rebuttal argument, the prosecutor stated "[w]e didn't get that good bottom 
breath that Deputy Davlin talked about, the good bottom breath that could have resulted 
in a higher blow. And why? Because she didn't want to blow properly. She refused to 
blow properly." (Trial Tr., p.234, Ls.8-12.) However this was a misrepresentation of the 
testimony presented. There was never any testimony admitted at trial that Ms. Eldred 
did not want to blow properly or refused to blow properly. 
Officer Chamberlain testified that he explained to Ms. Eldred how she needed to 
blow into the machine. (Trial Tr., p.119, Ls.9-10.) She then blew into the machine, but 
her samples were deficient. (Trial Tr., p.120, Ls.1-4.) Officer Chamberlain did testify 
that Ms. Eldred "was attempting to blow, but she was doing an exaggerated ... cheeks 
puffed out [blow]." (Trial Tr., p.120, Ls.20-21.) He stated "[i]t looked like she was 
blowing extremely hard, but the machine was indicating to me that it was not receiving." 
(Trial Tr., p.120, Ls.21-23.) However, this testimony does not indicate Ms. Eldred was 
purposefully refusing to blow properly or that she did not want to blow properly. In fact, 
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Officer Chamberlain admitted that deficient samples can be caused when someone 
does not blow hard enough or long enough into the tube and that people putting their 
tongue over the mouthpiece when the blow is a common cause of a deficient sample." 
(Trial Tr., p.120, Ls.10-17.) Deputy Davlin also explained different causes of deficient 
samples and noted that ultimately it is up to the person blowing, how they blow in the 
tube. (Trial Tr., p.166, L.13- p.167, L.12.) However, this testimony does not indicate 
that someone not properly blowing in the tube is intentionally not providing a sample, as 
perhaps the person just does not understand how to properly blow in the tube. 
Therefore, by misrepresenting the testimony and implying Ms. Eldred refused to 
provide an adequate sample, the prosecutor committed misconduct resulting in 
fundamental error. 
3. The Prosecutor lmpermissibly Appealed To The Jury's Emotions, Asking 
The Jury To Image Themselves In The "Victim's" Shoes 
The prosecutor also tried to appeal to the emotions, passions, or prejudices of 
the jury by the use of inflammatory tactics designed to place the jury in the shoes of the 
"victim" and repeatedly referring to the fact that Ms. Eldred could have killed someone. 
See Phillips, 144 Idaho at 587-588. It is improper for a prosecutor to urge jurors to 
convict a criminal defendant by appealing "to the passions, fears and vulnerabilities of 
the jury." Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d at 1149. This includes urging a conviction to protect 
community values, preserve civil order, or deter future lawbreaking. Id. The problem 
with appeals to emotion is that it encourages the jury to convict the defendant based on 
reasons entirely separate from his own guilt or innocence. Id.; Phillips, 144 Idaho at 87, 
156 P.3d at 588 ("Nothing should tempt [the prosecutor] to appeal to prejudices, to 
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pervert the testimony, or make statements to the jury, which whether true or not, have 
not been proved."). 
During its closing argument, the State improperly tried to put the jury in "the 
victim's" shoes, stating in closing, "At this point in time, we are driving two lanes down 
the interstate. It is the afternoon. People are just driving the roads, you or I." (Trial Tr., 
p.220, L.24 - p.221, L.2.) By referring to the fact that people such as the prosecutor or 
jury members could have been driving down the road, the prosecutor is insinuating that 
any one of us could have been a victim of Ms. Eldred's alleged drinking and driving. 
Furthermore, the State repeatedly referenced the fact that Ms. Eldred could have 
killed someone while she was driving. The prosecutor stated "[a]II of this time, the 
defense would have you believe she is scared. It is that fear that is making her drive in 
a manner that could kill somebody." (Trial Tr., p.221, Ls.21-23.) The prosecutor also 
stated: 
Mr. Jones testified that this whole process took almost two hours. For 
almost two hours, he followed Ms. Eldred hoping should wouldn't kill 
somebody, to the point he puts his flashers on, and talks about the fact 
that he was put there for a reason. There was a reason he was following 
her, and it was so cool-I believe were is words-it was so cool, because 
none of the cars went by me. He truly believes he saved lives, and all 
because Ms. Eldred is driving that white Ford Tempo under the influence. 
(Trial Tr., p.220, Ls.3-12.) 
The argument to the jury that "you or I" could have been driving down the road 
when Ms. Eldred got into an accident and the repeated references to the fact that 
Ms. Eldred could have killed someone were appeals the jury's emotions and urged the 
jury to convict Ms. Eldred, not based on her blood alcohol content, but because she 
could have injured or killed someone and "you or I" could have been driving down the 
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road when that happened. Therefore the prosecutor committed misconduct in making 
these arguments, amounting to fundamental error. 
4. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Was Not Harmless And Deprived 
Ms. Eldred Of Her Right To A Fair Trial 
As set forth above, the numerous improper statements by the prosecutor each 
individually, or alternatively, viewed as whole, cannot be harmless. See State v. Gross, 
146 Idaho 15, 21, 189 P.3d 477,483 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Harrison, 136 Idaho 504, 
37 P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding that under the doctrine of cumulative error, the, 
"accumulation of irregularities, each of which in itself might be harmless, may in the 
aggregate show the absence of a fair trial."). "Society wins not only when the guilty are 
convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice 
suffers when any accused is treated unfairly." Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 
(1963). In State v. Wilbanks, 95 Idaho 346, 509 P.2d 331 (1973), the Idaho Supreme 
Court, when reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, quoted the language of the 
United States Supreme Court which found: 
'The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party 
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern 
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose 
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a 
case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and 
very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that 
guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with 
earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike 
hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his 
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a 
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring 
about a just one.' 
Id. at 353-354, 509 P.2d at 338, 339 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 
(1935) (emphasis added)). 
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Here it simply cannot be said, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the misconduct of 
the prosecutor in this case did not contribute to Ms. Eldred's conviction. Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507, 616 P.2d 1034, 
1043 (1980). Much of this case hinged on whether the jurors believed the accuracy of 
the breath test results and the witness' testimony. Although the BAC was .264, the 
results were obtained from a deficient sample. (Trial Tr., p.119, L.13 - p.120, L.8.) 
Mr. Jones was the only witness who saw Ms. Eldred driving; therefore whether the jury 
found him to be a credible witness was crucial. There were also contradictions in the 
testimony between Mr. Jones and Officer Chamberlain. The State's witness' testimony 
contradicted the Officer's. Mr. Jones testified that "she hit the door as the officer parked 
his car." (Trial Tr., p.67, Ls.3-5). Whereas, the officer testified that when he got out of 
his car she was still outside and he pursued her into the residence. (Trial Tr., p.97, L.10 
- p 102, L.7.) 
Ms. Eldred's friend, and owner of the home in Middleton, James Ashby, testified 
that when Ms. Eldred arrived at his home she was "a nervous wreck" and was scared 
because a person had been following her. (Trial Tr., p.182, L.9 - p.183, L.9.) He 
explained that Ms. Eldred's apartment had been broken into and things had been taken, 
making her more fearful than usual. (Trial Tr., p.183, L.22 - p.184, L.16.) Additionally, 
Mr. Ashby testified that Ms. Eldred's white Tempo did not drive very well, stating "I 
drove it back from Boise and you couldn't even stay on the freeway ... The steering is 
messed up, or something, because I was all over the road." (Trial Tr., p.184, L.22 -
p.185, L.3.) Finally, Mr. Ashby testified that Ms. Eldred arrived approximately five to 
fifteen minutes before Officer Chamberlain entered the home and that she drank 
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straight vodka that he had poured her into a coffee cup in that time. (Trial Tr., p.185, 
L.15-p.186, L.18.) 
Additionally, some of the prosecutorial misconduct that occurred would 
encourage the jury to convict based on factors outside evidence. For example, the 
State misrepresented the presumption of innocence as having ended before the case 
was submitted to the jury. The State also misrepresented the fact that Ms. Eldred 
purposefully did not provide an adequate sample. Finally, the State relied upon the 
ease of which the juror's could place themselves in the shoes of a potential victim 
driving down the road and being hit by a potentially drunk driver. Therefore, the 
prosecutor's appeal to their emotions and prejudices by attempting to have the jurors 
envision themselves as potential victims and repeated references to the fact that 
Ms. Eldred could have killed someone were likely highly effective given the nature of the 
charge. 
Finally, even if each incident separately is deemed harmless, the cumulative 
effect of the prosecutor's misconduct so infected the prosecutor's closing argument that 
Ms. Eldred was deprived of a fair trial and this Court cannot say, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the jury's verdict would have been the same. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ms. Eldred respectfully requests that this Court vacate her conviction for felony 
DUI and remand her case to the district court for a new trial. Additionally, Ms. Eldred 
respectfully requests that this Court vacate her sentence or the Order denying her Rule 
35 motion and reduce her sentence as it deems appropriate, or remand her case to the 
district court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 29th day of December, 20 
EATHER M. A ON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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